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Formalisation of failure mode analysis for control systems 
Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Some simple systems work continuously until there is a failure, and then 
stop. The quality of such systems can be measured by reliability - the prob-
ability that the system will perform its function for a specified period. 
For complex control systems, the situation is not so simple. There are 
many ways the system can fail, many recovery actions, and many different 
consequences of failure. Failure mode analysis is a way of judging the per-
formance of such systems, by tracing the sequence of events following each 
failure, or each group of failures. It is useful, because it can isolate those 
cases where the probability of failure is high, or those where the probability 
is low, but the consequence is serious. During design, failure mode analysis 
can help to pinpoint those areas where design changes are necessary. 
Various diagramatic aids are available (see e.g. Nielsen and Runge 
1 973 ), which help record the sequence of events, and the 
probabilities of different conditions, in a system prone to failure. Diagram-
atic aids are a great help, because one of the. problems of failure mode analysis 
3f a complex system, is to imagine all of the different things which could 
happen in a system, to decide which is most important, and to record them. 
For very complex systems, such as those involving computers, it is 
difficult, even with the aid of diagrams, to keep track of all the information 
involved in a failure mode analysis. Such a system may have many thousands 
of components, each with a low failure rate . Some will be more critical to 
system performance than others. The analysis of such a system is very time 
consuming, and may be impossible for practical purposes. 
By formalising the task of failure mode analysis, the difficulties become 
more clear, and some techniques for reducing the difficulties appear. Hope-
fully, formalisation will allow some of the tasks of failure mode analysis to 
be automated, as has been done for electronic logic systems (see e. g. Chang 
et alia 1970 ) 
The first step in formalising analysis of failure event sequences, is to 
define what is meant by a system. The description should be sufficiently 
powerful to include all the components which are encountered in realistic 
systems (valves, computers, people). This task is dealt with in chapter 2. 
The next step is to define what is meant by a failure event, and to explain 
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how the consequences of an event are calculated. This involves describing a 
system as a set of interconnected components; and providing a method for 
deducing the consequences within or at the output of a component, when an 
event occurs at the input of the component. The logic of cause and effect in a 
control system is treqted in chapter 3. 
In chapter 4, these ideas are applied to sequences of events, taking place 
in chains of system components. In chapter 5, the practical consequences of 
these ideas are considered. 
Notation, and the mathematical background for the methods used is given 
in appendix 1. Appendix 2 describes the deduction methods used for event 
sequences. Appendix 3 describes the methods for calculating event probability 
distributions. 
Chapter 2 
SYSTEM DESCRIPTIONS 
Formal descriptions of systems 
Failure mode analysis involves describing what happens within a system 
under failure conditions. Such a description could take the form of a mental 
image of what happens, or a text description of the sequence of events in the 
system, or a diagram showing the sequence of events and progress of con-
tinuous changes. These descriptions are informal, where they are derived 
from a mental picture of the system. 
A formal description of a system is a description written according to 
certain precise rules, and with corresponding precise rules for manipulation 
and use. For purposes of failure mode analysis, the two kinds of model a re 
complementary. The formal description may be more detailed, or less 
detailed, than an informal description. But the consequences of the formal 
description can be evaluated systematically, and the degree of completeness 
of the evaluation can be measured. 
Control systems involve many complex components such as computers, 
switching circuits, amplifiers, and devices such as motors and turbines, which 
are not usually described by one common theory. General systems theory 
{Windeknecht 1971 ) does provide a tool for describing such varied 
components, and has been used here. Appendix 1 provides an abbreviated 
version of the thf ory. 
General systems theory enables a system to be described as a collection 
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of interconnected 'black boxes'. The interconnections are called inputs and 
outputs, each input and each output is a (possibly vector) function of time. 
Different time bases (time sets) can be used to describe different systems. 
This is important, because some systems, such as switching networks, a re 
best described in terms of a discrete time base, others, such as motors, in 
t e rms of continuous t ime. 
A system description provides information about the relationship between 
input and output functions of t ime. Any system can be described by specifying 
the set of possible input functions of time, the set of possible output functions 
of time, and a mapping between them. In general, there will be an additional 
(vector) parameter, the state of the system at some particular time, before 
the mapping becomes completely specified. This is a requirement; for a 
particular input function of time and a particular system state, there should 
be only one output function of time. 
A system description is 'complete', if it allows the output function of a 
system to be determined uniquely, given an input function of t ime. For many 
purposes, it is sufficient to have a partial description of a system, for example 
one which specifies the output for those inputs normally met in practice. 
A system description is 'consistent" if for each particular state of the 
system at each point in time, every subsequent input function results in only 
one output function. All system descriptions should be consistent. 
If a system description is inconsistent, it may mean that a mistake has 
been made in writing it down. Alternatively, it may mean that the description 
is an inadequate model of reality. For example the 'not gate' shown in fig. 1 
is connected from output to input. The description alongside the 'not gate' is 
adequate for many purposes, but not in the configuration shown. The descrip-
tion leads to a contradiction because the switching delay of the 'not gate' has 
not been described. 
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Not gate description 
Input = x, x(t) = 0 or x(t) = 1 
Output = y, y(t) = 0 or y(t) = 1 
x(t) = 0 implies y(t) = 1 
x(t) = 1 implies y{t) = 0 
Inter connection description 
x(t) = y(t) 
Fig. 1 Inconsistent system description 
Such a trivial fault as this would be detected easily in most design procedures. 
For more complex examples, checking for consistency provides a way of 
detecting some types of design e r r o r s , and modelling e r r o r s . 
An example 
An example is given here to show how formal notation can be used to 
describe simple systems. The system is chosen to be as simple as possible, 
while still providing an interesting failure mode analysis problem. Just the 
system itself is described here, analysis will be treated la ter . Fig. 2 shows 
a system for supplying compressed air for pneumatic operation of machinery. 
The demand is fluctuating and intermittent, but requires a reasonably con-
stant pressure . Hence a compressor with limited capacity is provided, and 
a reservoir t n k is provided to smooth pressure fluctuations, and accomadate 
peak demand. For safety reasons, both the peak pressure and the minimum 
pressure in the system must be limited, and sensors are provided for safety 
reasons. 
The example is typical of many installations, except that greater emphasis 
has been placed on safety than is usual. 
X 
NO T 
y 
x(t) = 0 implies y(t) = 1 
x(t) = y(t) 
x(t) = 0 implies x(t) ~ 1 
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Fig.1. Schematic diagram of compressed air supply system. 
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Fig. 2 A simplified compressed air supply system 
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The input and output functions of the various components in the block 
diagram are as follows. 
F , 
F , 
F 3 
F 4 
P , 
P , 
V 
X 
z 
u 
y 
K r K i 6 
air flow from compressor into accumalator 
a i r flow from accumalator to regulating valve 
air flow from safety valve 
air flow from regulating valve to supply lines 
air pressure in accumalator 
air pressure in supply lines 
motor power supply voltage 
regulating valve position 
pressure regulator switch signal 
on-off switch position 
on-off switch output 
constants 
K g m / s 
K g m / s 
K g m / s 
K g m / s 
Kg/cm 
Kg/cm 
Volt 
cm 
off/ on 
off/on 
off/ on 
The various components, when working properly, can be described by 
motor/compressor 
F ^ t ) ^K1 V(t) 1 
relay 
y(t) = 0 implies V(t) = 0 
y(t) = 1 implies V(t) = K ] 4 2 
pressure switch 
if P ^ t ) * K2 then z(t) = 1 
else z(t) =0 3 
on off switch 
if u(t) = 'on* then y(t) = z (t) 
else y(t) = 0 4 
accumalator 
P , (t) = K3 f (F1 (T) - F 2 ( T ) - F3(T))dT + P , (tQ) 5 
safety valve ° 
valve closed if P (t) « K4 then Fg(t) = 0 
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regulating valve
 0 
F (t) l 
if x( t )>OthenP 2 ( t ) = P ^ t ) - K6 - J J ^ 
and F2(t) = F4(t) 
if x(t) = 0 then F2(t) = 0 7 
valve actuator 
valve closed: if P 2 ( t ) » K 7 /K g then x(t) = 0 
normal range: if K12"» P 2 ( t )> 7 /K g then x(t) = K ? - Kg P2(t) 
fully open: _if P2(t)>- K ] 2 then x(t) = K ) 5 8 
= K7 - Kg - K1 2 
The descriptions given here are much simplified and are only valid within 
the normal operating range of the plant. The notation used is a mixture of 
arithmetic and logical symbols. Automatic manipulation of the descriptions 
is possible. 
The statement which describes the relationship between input and output 
of a system is called the system predicate. 
Classification of systems 
It is possible to classify systems according to the mathematical properties 
of their descriptions. Two of these classifications are important here because 
they require a different treatment in failure mode analysis. 
A memoryles s system is one in which the output at time t is determined 
uniquely by the value of the input at time t. Many control system components 
are usually described as memoryless systems e. g. amplifiers. Memoryless 
systems have only one possible value for their ' s ta te ' . 
Memoryless components are especially easy to t reat in failure mode 
analysis because, in evaluating the effect of an event on the component, only 
the effect on output need be considered. There will be no effect on their s tate. 
Also, the effect of the event on output will be a function of the current value 
of input alone, and not of the past history of the input. 
Very simple descriptions of memoryless systems can be given in stan-
dard form of an equation, giving the output of the system at time t explicitly 
in te rms of the system inputs at time t. 
Time dependent systems are those in which the output at time t is a 
function of input at time t, of the state of the system, and of the time t. In 
effect, value of time becomes an extra parameter of the state of the system. 
A classic example of a time dependent system is an alarm clock. But any 
system which ages noticeably with time, that i s , has performance parameters 
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which change with time, is most conveniently described as a time dependent 
process. 
Time dependent systems are difficult to t reat in fpilure mode analysis, 
because not just the effect of a single failure event needs to be considered, but 
all the different effects that the event can have, corresponding to the different 
times at which the event can occur. 
Cause and effect 
Failure mode analysis is a technique which enables initial failure events, 
that is , causes, and their subsequent effects, to be studied. To this end, the 
models to be used in failure mode analysis must be cause-effect models. 
The system descriptions provided by general system theory fulfill one of 
the basic requirements for a cause-effect model of a system. Cause must 
follow effect in t ime. General system descriptions must satisfy the condition 
that output at any time is a function of previous state, previous input, and 
time itself. Thus any change in output must follow a corresponding change in 
input, or a change in the system itself, (these are changes in the model of 
input and output. In a real system, effect always follows cause, by definition). 
A causal model of a system also requires that the direction of cause and 
effect be determined, that i s , inputs and outputs be distinguished clearly. This 
is not so straightforward, as many systems may work in either direction. 
For exariple, a d. c. rotating machine may be treated as either a motor or a 
generator, and the shaft torque may be considered to be either input or out-
put. 
Some system models have an inherent direction of causality, since one 
output may correspond to several different inputs. For example, a relay has 
many different values of coil current (input) but only two values of contact 
resistance (output). Descriptions in which there is a one to one correspondence 
between input and output functions of time are called 'bifunctional * or 'one to 
one'. The direction of flow of cause and effect is not determined if a system 
has a bifunctional description, and must be specified separately. 
All energy flow systems are inherently bidirectional. Taking a ' force' P, 
a flow' F , and an 'impedance' R, then P = FR. Either force or flow can be 
considered a cause, but if one is a cause, the other necessarily is an effect. 
Generally a variable in a system is considered to be a cause, if small 
changes in its value correspond to large changes in other variables; and if 
large changes in other variables correspond to smell changes in its value. 
For example, varying load on an amplifier hardly affects the input signal, 
relative to its normal range of variation. But changes in the input signal cause 
wide varirttions in output. 
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The energy flow aspects of information and control systems are usually 
utglected, and design is such that the direction of cause and effect is clear. 
For those parts of a system involving important energy or mass flows, it is 
desirable to have a method of assigning directions of causality, as far as is 
possible. 
A component of a system may be described in terms of a set of variables, 
without designating any of the variables as input or output variables. If the 
system is potentially bidirectional, than it is possible to describe the system 
by means of one or more equations (possibly implicit). For each equation, 
there will be one dependent variable and one or more independent (cause) 
variables. 
System described by equations can be represented in the form of a graph, 
with two types of nodes - variable nodes and equation nodes. A variable node 
is connected by an arc to an equation node, if the variable appears in the 
corresponding equation. Fig. 3 shows the compressed air supply system 
expressed in this way. 
Initially a graph constructed in this way is undirected, and assigning 
causal directions to the graph turns it into a directed graph. 
Fi rs t , directions associated with control components such as relays and 
amplifiers are marked on the graph. Then causal directions may be assigned 
according to the rule that each equation may serve to determine only one 
variable, and hence must have just one are leaving it. Similarly each variable 
must be determined by just one equation. 
These rules serve to assign directions in all cases except those in which 
there is a loop in the graph, with each equation in the group being bidirectional 
(The associated system is bifunctional). In these cases, the direction of 
causality could be considered arbi t rary. 
Loops in cause-effect graphs 
Given a set of equations which specify a graph with a single loop, there 
are two possible ways of assigning causality to the loop. (Fig. 4). A rule 
which can be used for assigning causal directions, is to make the assignment 
in the direction of 'greatest sensitivity'. This means, taking fig. 4 for example, 
that causal directions are first of all assigned in both possible ways, ACB 
and BCA. Taking the case ACB, the loop is broken after variable B, and the 
variation of A for a given variation in x is determined. Then the variation in 
A for a given variation in x is determined, with the loop closed. The ratio of 
the two variations is taken. The rat io is also determined for B, with the loop 
broken after variable A. The variable for which the ratio is greatest becomes 
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the first in the causality chain. 
This method of assigning causality can be applied to linear continuous 
systems (where the ratios in the example become 
d A a ^ 
/d x | E const , Tx~ | A constant N 
dA cTB J 
ctX <5x 
It can also be applied to other types of system, provided that the concept of 
varia**on is defined appropriately. The method can be generalized to multi-
variable, multiloop systems of equations ( Bristol 1965 ). 
For cause effect analysis, the way of assigning causality described above 
will give an approximation to ihe effect of a cause on the variables in the loop. 
If cause-effect analysis i s iterated around the loop, the iteration will con-
verge, to give closer approximations to the true effects. 
A special case of this method is to assign causality in the direction of 
integration, rather than differentiation, when there is a choice. In this way, 
a step function 'cause ' results in 'effect' variations which a re finite. In many 
cases , the method of assigning causality described above will give no clear 
cut answer, because the ratios of variations involved are of similar magnitude. 
In these cases , the concept of causality will also be of little use - the 'cause' 
resul ts in a reaction 'effect' almost as strong as the cause itself. 
In such c case, it is better to regard the variables involved in the loop 
as a subsystem in their own right, and to consider just the inputs and outputs 
of the loop as being causally determined. On meeting such a system in failure 
mode analysis, the only available method is to rely on 'solving the balance 
equations of the loop', without appealing to cause and effect. 
Careful attention to the logical basis for assigning cause effect relation-
ships is important in failure mode analysis, because very often models of a 
system are appropriate only over their normal working range. In failure 
situations, a model may cease to be appropriate, and even the direction of 
causality may change. For example, for a pump with output at atmospheric 
pressure , flow is considered a dependent variable. If the output is now shut 
off by a valve at the pump outlet, flow is fixed, and pump output pressure 
becomes a dependent variable 
- 12 -
Chapter 3 
CAUSE AND CONSEQUENCE 
Cause - Consequence analysis 
Cause - consequence analysis (D.S. Nielsen 1973) is a technique for 
tracing all the conditions which can lead to a failure event; and for tracing the 
consequences of that event through the various components of the system. A 
method is needed for representing not only the system itself, but also for 
representing conditions and events. These will be used for deducing the effect 
of an event at the input to a system component, on the state of the component 
itself, and on the output of the system. 
A condition can be described by a statement, or predicate. This state-
ment gives the value of some function of time, over a period of t ime. Alterna-
tively, the statement may not describe the time function completely, but 
only some properties of the function which restr ic t the range of possible 
functions. For example statements that a function is constant over a period 
of time; that the value of a function is equal to a given value over a period; 
or that a function is monotonically increasing over a period; or that the 
function is less ihan a given value; all of these constitute descriptions of con-
ditions. Such statements can be expressed formally, using the notation of 
logic and of set theory. The condition takes the form of a predicate, with a 
span of time as a parameter. 
Events too can be expressed by means of a predicate, similar in form 
to the description of a condition. The event description is associated with a 
point in t ime, and the meaning is that before the event t ime, the predicate is 
untrue. At the event t ime, the event predicate becomes t rue , (see fig. 5). 
As an example of an event description, the description of the event in 
which the pressure in the compressed a i r reservoir increases over the safety 
valve opening pressure is 
n o t P j ( t ) > K 4 - P , ( t}>K 4 
This statement is not a complete description of an event in logical t e rms , 
but may be regarded as an abbreviation of the form given later in this chapter. 
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General scheme for events: 
not Q . Q 
t -• time 
Q is event predicate 
example of an event description: 
n o U P ^ t ) ) ^ ) i y t ) ) k 4 
Fig. 5 Scheme for event descriptions, and an example 
Deducing the consequences of an event 
The simplest type of component which can be treated by failure mode 
analysis is one with a memoryless, time independent description, a single 
input, and a single output. 
If an event occurs at the input to such a component, then an event may 
occur at the output of the component. The description of such an event can be 
obtained by a process of deduction. 
An example of the deduction process is provided by the safety valve of the 
compressed a i r system. The event at the input to the valve is that in which 
a i r pressure r i ses above valve t r ip pressure . The event at the output of the 
valve component (Fig. 2) is that the flow through the valve ceases to be zero . 
Figure 6b shows this example, and it seems an excessive amount of 
description for a conclusion which is almost obvious. The important point is 
that the output event description can be ded iced according to a standard pro-
cedure. If necessary, this procedure can be automated, using a computer. 
event description NOT I" I I 
event description NOT R R 
: component description 
NOT P and Q implies not R 
P and Q implies R 
Fig. 6a Simple event deduction across a component 
safety valve 
description 
Not P,(t)>K P l ( * ) > K 4 
if P (t) <K4 then F3(t) = 0 
else F3(t) = K5 V P 7 ( t ) - P a 
event not Fg(t) / 0 
Fig. 6b Example 
From the example, it can be seen that there are several possible output 
event descriptions, for example 
E: F3(t) = 0 - not_F3(t) = 0 
E:not_F3(t) = K5fP^T!l - Fg(t) = Kg VT^t) 
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Which is the correct output event description ? 
The requirements for an output event description are that as much infor-
mation as possible should be retained, concerning the output variables; that 
no unnecessary information concerning the input variables should be retained; 
and the output event description should not be redundant. 
These requirements are satisfied by taking first of all the event descrip-
tion, and the system description and reducing them to a simplified standard 
form. Several different forms are possible, depending on the kind of notation 
used, but for simple logical notation, a form known as conjunctive normal form 
is used (see e .g . Nilsson 1971). 
The result of a transformation to conjunctive normal form is an expression 
consisting of clauses, linked by 'and* operators. Each term consists of a 
comparison, an equality, or the negation of a comparison or equality. The 
result of transferring the safety valve example to conjunctive normal form is 
shown in fig. 7. 
The next step is to draw as general conclusions as possible from the 
statements, and this can be done using a process .ailed resolution (Robinson 
1965). If there is an expression of the form 
(A £T B or C) 
and (F or G _or (not C)) 
then an additional clause is added of the form 
and (A or B or F or G) 
This process is repeated (in its most general form) as often as possible 
(see fig. 8). 
The next step is to remove as much redundant information as possible. 
This means that if there is an expression such as A and (A or B) , the 
clause (A or B) is deleted. The reasoning here is that information represented 
by (A or B) is uncertain, may be contradicted by more certain information in 
other clauses, and in any case does not indicate the certainty of occurrence 
of an event. The process of deleting clauses is called subsumption. 
Finally, any clauses dealing with input variables alone may be deleted, 
as irrelevant. 
The result of this process is a single logical expression giving the con-
ditions at the output of a component at the time of an event. The process is 
repeated, with the negation of the input event description, to obtain the de-
scription of the conditions prior to the event. 
The only remaining step is to ascertain whether any change is involved 
at the output as a result of the input event. If the description of conditions 
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event- —> P ^ t ) > K4 
safety valve: if Pj(t) * K4 
Conjunctive normal form 
1 not P,{t) < K4 
2 .and (not P ^ t ) = K4) 
3 and ((not P}{t) K4) or Fg(t) = 0 
4 and ((not P,( t) = K 4) or F3(t) = 0 
5 and (P1 (t) < K 4 o r P ^ t ) =K 4 or Fg(t) = f T ^ t l 
Fig. 7 Conjunctive normal form for statement of safety valve t r ip event 
(conditions after event) 
Resolution between 1 and 5 
6 and (P^ t ) = K4 or Fg(t) = V P 1 (t) } 
Resolution between 2 and 6 
Delete clauses 3,4, 5, 6 by subsumption 
I'-. 'ete clauses 1 and 2 - do not affect F„ 
Which leaves 
P3(t) =lfP7F) 
Fig. 8 Deduction of an output event description (conditions after event) 
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after the input event is the same as the description of the conditions before 
the input event, then there is no output event, since there has been no change 
in output conditions. Similarly, if output condition after the event time is a 
logical consequence of the output condition before the event time, then no 
output event can be recorded (no new information about the output conditions 
has been produced). 
Whether the second condition is a logical consequence of the first can be 
decided by trying to deduce the second from the first, possibly using an auto-
matic theorem prover (see e .g . Robinson 1965). 
As the example shows, the correct output event description for the safety 
valve is 
E: F3(t) = 0 —* F3(t) = K5 V P ^ t j 
Formal description of events 
For memoryless control system components, the effect of an event at 
the input to the component will be an immediate event at the output of the 
component, or no output event at all. For a component with memory, there 
may be output events which a re delayed, and there may also be a change in 
state within the systems. Also, whether an output event occurs will generally 
depend on the state of the system at the time of the input event. 
For these reasons, the event descriptions must be accompanied by a 
statement of the time at which the event occurs, and a more general form of 
event description is required. Also some more formal idea of what constitutes 
a condition and what constitutes the deduction of an event, is required. No 
simple definition can be given of what constitutes a condition description, 
but an idea of the range of what is possible is given by the following set of 
examples 
1
 condition P holds for function f during period tj to t« ' 
H holds (P, t r t 2 , f) 
• p-fV v n 
At this point, there are many form the condition description could take. 
For example, let T be a set of instants of time. Then the following is a con-
dition 
for all t, t is a T and tj * t * t implies P" (t, f) 
Another possible form is 
for al l t , t , , t is a T and t is a T affil tj < t& { tfa t t 2 
implies f(ta) * f (tb) 
In general, if P( t , , t9 , f) is a condition description, then 
for all t , t. , [ t isa T and t. isa T 
a b a b 
implies P(t t. ) 
This constitutes a test to discover if a statement is a condition description. 
Given a definition of what constitutes a condition, an event can be defined. 
The idea is given by the following set of equivalences 
'event E occurs for function f at t ime t1 
= occurs (E, t, f) 
= E ' (t,f) 
= E " ( P , ( t ] , t, f), P 2 ( t , t2 , f)) 
= there is a t ; such that P . ( t , , t, f) 
and there isa t , such that P2( t , t„, f) 
a n d n o t J P ^ , tb , f ) impUes P J t ^ , t f) 
where Pj and P„ are condition descriptions 
An event occurs at time t if an expression of this form can be deduced 
from other true statements concerning the system. 
Components with memory 
A method is required which enables event descriptions to be deduced for 
components with memory. There are two major types of problem here . F i r s t , 
it is desirable for convenience that the deduction of an output event be obtained 
by considering only a single input event, rather than considering all possible 
sequences of one, two, events, etc. Secondly, it may be possible to deduce the 
occurrence of an output event at some time after the input event, but on the 
condition that nothing else happens at the input to counteract the (potential) 
output event. 
A scheme for deduction of events accross a component with memory is 
given in figure 9. 
The notation 
A B 
of figure 9. means that given statements A and B, statement C can be deduced. 
The state condition S2 can be deduced from the state condition S , the 
input conditions P , and ? y and the component description R. By keeping track 
of the different state conditions during a sequence of events, state and output 
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changes can be deduced by combining information from a single event and the 
state, rather than making deductions from statements about a sequence of 
events. This will become especially significant in the next chapter. 
The output conditions Q , can be deduced from the state condition S the 
^ 1' 
input conditions P and Pg, and the component description R 
therisa t1 suchthat P 1 ( t , J t, x) therisa t„ suchthat P,( t . t„, x) 
R, therisa t1 
therisa t„ suchthat Q, (t„, t ' .g) 
R, therisa t~ suchthat 
therisa t . suchthat Q2(t*. t . , y) 
1 (therisa t, suchthat (P.f t , . t, x)) and R and_(therisa t, suchthat S J t , , t, s)) 
therisa t„ suchthat Q, (t„, t ' , y) 
2 (therisa t , suchthat S.(t . , t, s)) and R and (therisa t 0 suchthat P„(t, t?, x)) 
therisa t 2 suchthat S„(t, t«, s) 
3 (therisa t , suchthat S ^ t j , t, s)) and R and (therisa t , suchthat P ?( t , t^,x)) 
therisa t^ suchthat Q 2( t \ t . , y) 
4 not ((therisa t- suchthat Q1 (t„, t1, y)) implies (therisa t,. suchthat Q,(t', t . , y)) 
P - input conditions Q - output conditions 
R - Component description S - state conditions 
Fig. 9 Scheme for deduction of an output event 
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In general, the output condition will take the form of a statement about y which 
is dependent on the initial state condition S1 , and on the length of time t to 
t9 for which the input condition holds. Once again the rules of resolution 
(augmented with special rules for > , = , etc.), subsumption and nonrelevance 
can be used to derive an output description. (Appendix 2). 
Example 
As an example of a deduction accross a component with memory, the 
pressure sensitive switch can be used. The description associated with fig. 2 
is oversimplified. Such components usually incorporate hysteresis , to avoid 
over frequent switching of the air compressor. The description incorporating 
hysteresis i s : 
pressure switch 
if P , ( t ) < K g then s(t) = 1 
a n d ^ P ^ t ) ) K1 0 then s(t) = 2 
and if (K 9 * P ^ t U K ^ 
and there isa t^ such that (t1 < t 
and forall t ' , tj< t* < t implies s(t') = 1)) 
then s(t) = 1 
and if (Kg A P . (t) < K] Q and therisa t^ such that 
(t1 < t and forall t ' , tj < t* < t implies s(t ') = 2)) 
then s(t) = 2 
and if s(t) = 1 then z(t) = 1 
and if s(t) = 2 then z(t) = 0 
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The idea of this definition is to give the output of the pressure switch in 
terms of a state. S(t) and a condition on the input, P . ( t ) . The description is 
somewhat unwieldy because of the difficulties in expressing facts about con-
tinuous functions in a simple system of logic. For general use, a more con-
cise notation is desirable. This is used in figure 10, where the notation 
s(t-) is used to represent the state of the system an instant before the event 
time t. 
The event description deduced for the pressure switch is 
s(t-) = 2 and if P(t+) < Kg then s(t+) - 1 
The event deduced is a state change event, and is dependent on certain con-
ditions being fulfilled by the input function P,( t ) . To achieve this description 
a new rule was needed - there were two possibilities for the output, s(t+) = 
2 or s(t+) = 1. One of these corresponded to an event, the other did not. Work-
ing backwards, the input conditions for an event to occur, were derived. The 
result is the description of a 'conditional event'. 
Complete deduction methods 
The methods used is deducing output events so far are resolution and 
subsumption. These methods apply to expressions involving 'forall ' , ' there 
is a', 'and', 'or ' , 'not*, 'implies1. Extra rules must be used for handling 
'greater than', 'is a' and 'equals' operators , and here, such rules have been 
used on an ad hoc basis. 
Resolution and subsumption, when applied to expressions involving 
logical symbols only, a re 'complete'. The result of applying resolution is to 
find all possible deductions of a certain form from an initial set of clauses. 
This means that the corresponding output event description is certain to be 
found. 
For expressions involving numeric and set operators, such complete 
methods are not generally possible. However, incomplete methods will 
generally give satisfactory results , more efficiently. 
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Pressure switch 
if P,(t) < Kg then s(t) = 1 
and if P , ft) ) K,
 Q then s(t) = 2 
event description 
pi<4-> > K i o 
andP,( t+) < K1Q 
Conjunctive normal form 
not P ^ t ) <K g or s(t) = 1 1 
a n d P ^ t X K ^ o r P , ( t ) =K 1 Q or s(t) = 2 2 
w i d P 1 ( t ) < K 9 o r n o t P j t t ) = K ^ o r n o t s(t-) = 1 or s(t) = 1 3 
and Pj(t) Kg or not P ^ t ) K 1 Q £ r mrt s(t-) = 1 or s(t) = 1 4 
andPj I t ) Kg or not P (t) = K 1 Q £ r not s(t-) = 2 or_s(t) =2 5 
and Pj(t) Kg or not P ^ t ) K1Q OT not s(t-) = 2 ^ r s(t) = 2 6 
andnot_ P(t-) K1() 7 
andnot^ P(t-) = K1Q 8 
and P(t+) K1Q , 9 
Resolve 7 and 2 : and P (t) = K- 0 or s(t-) =2 10 
Resolve 8 and 10:ands( t - ) = 2 11 
Resolve 9 and 6: and P(t+) Kg or not s(t-) = 2 or s(t+) 12 
Resolve 11 and 12: and Pft+) Kq or s(t+) = 2 13 
Resolve 13 and 1; and s(t+) = 1 £ r s(t+) =2 14 
11 and 14 together provide an event description, but a better form can be 
obtained by combining with 1 
s(t-) - 2 and if P ^ t + X Kg then s(t+) = 1 
Fig. 10 Deduction accross a component with memory - pressure switch 
pynmple 
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Chapter 4 
CAUSE - CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS 
Event chains 
The methods described in the last chapter enable the consequences of a 
single event on a single component to be evaluated. Consequence analysis is 
a method of tracing through networks of components, calculating output events 
for one component, and then treating these as input events for the next com-
ponents in the network. In this way, branching chains of events can be r e -
corded. (Fig. 11). The s tar t of such a chain of events will be a simple initial 
event in the normal operation of a piece of equipment; or a failure event. 
The occurrence of some events will depend on the conditions prevailing 
within a component, or within the rest of the system, when the event occurs. 
In some cases, complete ' t r ees ' of coincident conditions must be built up, 
in order to analyse under which conditions a particular event can take place. 
The process of building these t rees is called 'cause analysis ' . 
In failure mode analysis, one is interested in discovering if there are any 
conditions of normal operation which can cause a failure event; and in finding 
which failure events lead to further serious damage events. 
Failure events may usefully be divided into three classes. "Spontaneous 
failure events ' occur as a result of no recognised cause, on a statistical 
basis . 'Situation induced failure events' occur as a result of chance coinci-
dence of otherwise normal conditions within a system. 'Cascade failure events' 
occur as the result of other previous failures. 
For failure mode analysis, we need a model of all the components in a 
system, under normal operating conditions. A description is also required of 
the conditions under which the model is accurate, and the conditions under 
which another, failure model is required. 
A model is also required to express the seriousness or cost, of damage 
to a component. For example, for the compressed air system, the compressed 
a i r reservoir dangers can be represented by 
if Pift) 2 x K. then cost is high 
The objective of a failure analysis will be to find those possible failure events 
with a high cost. 
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Block diagram 
of hardware 
Fit:. 1 1. 'Unwinding' an event sequence chain from a hardware block diagram. 
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Tracing event chains 
Formal methods of cause - consequence analysis can be regarded as t rans-
lating from a block diagramdescription of a system to an event sequence dia-
gram, by a process of 'unwinding1. A notation for event sequence diagrams 
is given in figure 12 (Probability rules for each box are also given, see appen-
dix 3). 
The simplest case of event tracing is for a block diagram with a set of 
components connected in ser ies (fig. 13). For each possible initial event 
(spontaneous or situation induced) there will be a simple chain of events. How-
ever, if ther« a re any components with memory, then the event chain may 
branch, depending on the state of the component. At any point an event chain 
may simply stop, because there are no further events to be observed. 
event description box 
J—h 
or box for conditions 
if 
and box for conditions 
NOT BOX FOE CONDITIONS 
Fig. 12. 
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event A or event B occurs 
depending on condition C 
condition C is the condition that 
event A has happened 
delay involved in passing from 
one event to another 
cost per 
event = c 
expression for cost of a failure 
event. 
Fig. 12. Continued 
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Block diagram Event sequence diagram 
1 
" 
2 
i 
3 
Component 
hos memory 
1 
« 
' ' 
S 
Condition » 
i 
Change of 
stato of 
3 
+ Event A 
at output of 
3 
" 
Event C 
at output of 
4 
Initial event 
in component 
1 
1
 ' 
Event 
at output of 
1 
" 
Event 
at output of 
2 
1 
Is slate of 3 
S , . 1 
1 1 N 
I 
1 
Event B 
at output of 
3 
!' 
Event D 
at output of 
S 
Fig. 13. Event tracing in se r ies connected components. 
- 28 -
Other cases important in event tracing are given in figure 14. If a component 
has two output connections, it will give r i se to a fork in the event sequence 
diagram and to two subsequent event chains. 
If a component has two input connections, then the consequences of an 
event at one input connection will depend on the conditions at the other con-
nection. The result is a conditional fork in the event sequence diagram, and 
also a syscematic evaluation of the conditions may be required. 
Feedback loops in a block diagram can result in long sequences of events, 
involving some delay between events. The sequence may continue indefinitely 
(that is , until some other spontaneous event interrupts the sequence) or the 
system may reach a stable state in which no further events occur. 
If a loop in a block diagram involves components with memory, especial 
care is needed. Several 'delayed event' chain can occur as the result of one 
input event. If the effect of the first of these event chains is evaluated, it 
may lead to the conclusion that the conditions for the other event chains are 
not maintained. The consequences of the later 'delayed events' may not need 
to be evaluated. 
Multiple failures 
One of the most useful aspects of cause - consequence analysis is the 
help it provides in evaluating the consequences of multiple failures. At a 
formal level, there are two practical aspects of multiple failure problems -
firstly, in a cascade of failure events which influence each other, the relative 
timing of the events is important - and secondly, a failure event may 'not lead 
to subsequent damage events as a direct result , but only to a change of state 
of a component, an 'unrevealed fault', which may make its presence felt 
under later changed conditions. 
The problem of relative timing of events in several 'parallel ' chains of 
events, can be solved by first evaluating the chains of events, tentatively -
and then considering whether the different chains can represent reality by 
considering the logical consequences of different event timings. 
R IS U V Evtnt 
RS 
T" 
Component with two outputs 
Event 
pa 
Event 
U V 
RorS 
Event 
pa 
Component with two inputs 
1 
Condition 
R 
— -
Evtnt 
U, Vi 
RorS 
R 1 S 
J L 
.... 
Condition 
S 
Evtnt 
U2 V2 
PlQ. 
T v[x_ 
Loop 
Evtnt 
pa I 
Evtnt 
RiSi 
Evtnt 
Vi Xi J 
Evtnt 
Ra Sa 
Evtnt 
V2 X2 
Evtnt 
1, U, 
Evtnt 
Ta U2 
Fig. 14. Block diagrams and event sequence diagrams. 
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The second problem, of unreve^led faults, is solved by recording any 
possible state changes, or permanent changes in component model, which 
are possible as a result of some initial event. Then subsequent event chain 
evaluations must take into account not only the different normal conditions 
for the component, but also the possible failure conditions. An iterative 
process is required to provide a complete analysis of all unrevealed faults. 
An example of systematic failure mode analysis 
The example of the compressed air supply system will be used to illus-
trate systematic failure mode analysis. The analysis provided here is not 
thorough, since it involves only two failures, in the relay, and in the safety 
valve. An attempt has been made to follow a systematic algorithm for the 
analysis (fig. 15) but the needs of presentation require the use of some heu-
rist ic rules. 
1 Record initial conditions for system and set time t. = t 
J
 i o 
2 Select initial event, call it A 
3 Apply event A to relevant system component X 
4 Deduce changes of state, if any, and record them 
5 Deduce different events B, C, on different outputs of X, 
and at different times (on some output possibly}. 
6 If there were i o events B, C then take an event from an unfinished 
event chain, call it A, and go to 3. 
7 If there are no unfinished event chains, go to 1. If there are no more 
initial events, stop. 
8 Select the output event which occurs first on B, C at t . and call it F . 
9 Check event F to ensure that it is consistent with conditions at time t. -
i 
if not, delet F from B, C and go to 7 
10 Check other events on B, C to see if they are compatible with 
F if not, delete them. If they are , record them as unfinished event chains. 
11 Record F on the event sequence diagram. 
Update conditions to time t.. 
Replace t. by t., event A by event F. 
12 Go to 3. 
Fig. 15 Algorithm for consequence tracing 
Note: this algorithm does not cover all situations, but does cover those situ-
ations met in the example of fig. 16. 
The description of the system given with fig. 2 needs to be augmented, 
with information about the values of the constants involved, with information 
about the initial state of the system, and with information about load on the 
system. 
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The additional information required is provided by the following state-
ments. 
load i ! P 2 ( t ) > KH t h e n Fy*) > ° 
else F4(t) = 0; 
The constant values obey the following relations constants 
K 4 > K10 > K1t > K 9 > K12 
10 
damage 
i fPj( t ) >K4 x 1.5 then cost is high 
initial state 
W = ps«V=IW = W'W 
» J t ) = K | 5 
initial event 
= F4(t) 
u(t) = 'off1 - u(t) = 'on' 
Any automatic process will experience some difficulty in making deduc-
tions about a set of non linear equations. For this reason, the model of the 
regulating valve and actuator need to be reformulated. This can be seen, by 
deducing from statements 7 and 8 
if K,_ < P,(t) <K„/KH then P (t) = P.(t) - K 6 ( F 2 ( t ) ) , 
- 12 V 2 7 8 2 1 (K7 - K8(P2(t))2 
if P2(t) s. K 7 /K 8 then (x = 0 _and F2(t) = 0) 
if P2(t) < K 1 2 then_P2(t) = P,(t) - K ) 6 (F 2 ( t ) ) 2 
The problem is caused by the implicit equation in the first line, which 
may be replaced by 
if K , 2 < P2(t) < K 7 /K 8 then_(P2(t) = 9,(P,(t) - 92(F2(t)) 
andP 2 ( t ) * P,(t) 
and (F2(t) = 0 implies 9,(F?(t)) = 0)) 
If the regulating valve iF within its normal working range, the valve 
actuator component may then be ignored. 
The first task in the failure mode analysis is to investigate the normal 
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pi'fo>:-° 
switch on t • u = off —>u= on PjCt ) (. K,fl 
t„- y = o -» y= 1 <--»(*„) " 1 
motor on t : V(t ) = 0-»V(t) = K ] 4 
air supply tQ: F ^ t ) = 0 -»F , ( t ) =K, K ) 4 
conditions checked and 
established 
initial conditions 
P 1<" <,K10 
V(t) = K, 
l to . t , :F2(t)>0 _ , , t ] f\ F, dt 
M 4 
I F„(t)>0 
* . < P2 - F3 f > K4 
ure r ises 
Regulating Valve 
i t , : F2(t) = 0-F3(t)= KgVF^f t f -P^ t , ) ) K4 
safety valve opens - this chain of 
events abandoned 
since it involves a 
contradiction 
V V A 6 F,(t)-F2(t)*F3(t)dt>K2 
,X2: z(t) = 1 - z(t) = 0 • V^t2))K2 
This chain of events is abandoned, since 
the other chain, C, involves events which 
occur ear l ier . The immediate sympton is 
conflict in the condition t ree {not fully 
developed here) 
P ^ t J K , K 4 t «. — - tQ: F2(t) =0 
^ to t 2 : F 4 ( t ) - 0 - F 4 ( t ) > 0 * « t 2 : 
P 2 ( t ) > K n 
This sequence of events abondoned, 
because sequence E occurs first. 
s tarts to close t3 : x(t)=K ] 5_* x(t) = Kq - Kg P2(t) « - - tgi P2(t) > K ] 2 * — etc. 
i F 
Fig. 16 Normal operation of compressed air system 
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a i r begins 
to flow through 
regul. valve 
P res su re switch 
trips - com-
pressor stops 
V 
t • 
s 
t 
s 
t 
s 
t 
s 
t 
s 
*6 
F4(t) = 0 - F4(t) > 0 ^ 
F2(t) = 0 - F2(t) > 0 
P,(t) =K,K 4 
4 : P 2 ( t ) > K n etc. 
- P , ( t ) < K, K 4 t 
\ ^ * * safety valve opens -
Q >v chain abandoned 
regulating valve closes -
chain abondoned 
P , W - K 1 0 
s(t) = 1 
z(t) = 1 
y(t) = 1 
V ( t ) = K , 4 
F,(t)=K ] 4K, 
' P , ( t > > K 1 0 ^ y i ^ s K ^ - F ^ t l d t 
""
 S ( t ) = 2
 > K , n ands(t) = 1 
- z(t) = 0 , U 
- y(t) = 0-«-ts:u(t)=on 
- V(t) = 0 
- F,(t)= 0 
This is the first con 
dition which cannot be 
confirmed by examining 
initial conditions 
P,(t) = K 3 / t s K , K 9 - F2(t)dt - P,(t) = -K3/\s F2(t) 
. dt t F,(t) = 0 
\ \ 
\ safety valve opens -
\ chain abandoned 
regulating valve fully 
* open - chair, abandoned 
P , ( t ) > K 1 0 - P 1 (t) * K. 0 Firs t event of a pair - this 
one results in no further 
consequences, but the next, 
delayed longer, does have 
further consequences. 
P re s su re switch t . : P(t)»K„ 
t r ipscompressor t„: s(t)= 2 
- P(t) K9 
- s(t) = 1 
z(t)= 0 - z(t) = 1 
t , : y(t)= 0 - y(t) = 1 
t 7 : v ( t ) = 0 - V ( t ) = K 1 4 
t 7 : F , ( t ) = 0 - F,(t) =K, K ) 4 
t ^ S ^ - K j / ^ F ^ d t , P,( t) = K ^ K , K , 4 -
F2(t) d(t) t„: F,( t) = 0 
Event sequence diagram becomes 
repetitive here 
Fig. 16. Continued 
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operation of the system. The event sequence diagram for this is shown in 
fig. 16. The notation used is as follows 
P 
2 
condition at time t. t-: P q 
condition between time t. and time t, J K 
Failure descriptions 
Two types of failure event will be treated for the example of fig. 16. The 
first is failure of the safety valve by 'sticking', with the result that the valve 
does not open when it should. 
The valve failure can be described as follows. 
V 1? p ] (*) * K 4 t h e n F3(t) = 0 else Fg(t) = Kg Y P ^ T 
Applying this event to the safety valve component, under all the normal 
conditions derived in fig. 16, there are no output events to record for Fg(t)., 
because F„(t) = 0 under all normal conditions. However, the event should be 
recorded, in the same way that an event would be recorded for a change of 
state in a component with memory. 
The second failure event to be described is the failure of the relay by 
constant welding. The event can be described by. 
t e : (Y(t) = 0 implies V(t) = 0) and (Y(t) = 1 implies V(t) = K 1 4 ) 
This yields the event sequence diagram shown in fig. 17. 
Note that now, the effect of the unrevealed safety valve fault becomes 
apparent. 
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t g i P ^ t ^ K ^ . P ^ t ) * K g a n d s ( t ) = 2 
v(t) = ON and z(t) = 0 
j 
u(t) = OFF 
t : Y(t)= 0 implies V(t)= 0 jind Y(t)= 1 implies V(t)=KH 
- v(t) = K 1 4 Relay failure 
t : Y(t) = 0 
tg: V(t) = 0-V(t)=K,4 
t8: F3(t) = 0-*jt°: P,'(t) = K 3 /'s - F2'(t) dt 
event sequence abandoned, 
very similar to H 
- P , (t) = Kg/* F , (t) - F2(t) dt + P , (ts) 
L__ 7 
- H t 9 i P i W ' , ' K i o ' p i W > K i o l 
chain abandoned, similar to 
chain K. 
V ^ o ^ ' - V " * ) ^ 
t 1 0 : P l ( t ' * K 4 - » P 1 ( t ' > K 4 
Safety valve f 
fail, has not safety valve t r ips 
Safety valve failure 
, has occurred 
t ] 2 : P ^ t ) * K 4 x 1.5 
- P ] ( t ) ) K 4 x 1 . 5 
t. „: high cost damage 
event 
occurred-
*10 
'10 
-
F3(t) = 
P,(t) 
P,( t) -
""I i 
0 - F 3 ( t ) = 
=
 VtoF|W 
VP,(tj 
- F2(t)dt 
K 3 / * F j t ø - F j M - F j t o 
0 
V^W K 4 - pi<*) K4 
t„ : F3(t) = K5lTP1(t)-F3(t) safety valvel 
closes 
event sequence diagram becomes 
repetitive here 
Fig. 1 7 Failure mode analysis of relay and safety valve failure 
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Chapter 5 
PRACTICAL ASPECTS 
Significance of formal methods 
The techniques described in the previous chapters allow a rigorous 
meaning to be attached to the intuitive methods of failure mode analysis. The 
most important advantage is that a clear meaning can be given to thoroughness 
and completeness of a failure mode analysis. For example the statement 'An 
analysis has been made of all interactions between components, except inter-
actions accross insulation and physical ba r r i e r s ' acquires meaning because 
it becomes possible to consider 'all interactions' . 
Used as a tool in reliability oriented design, such methods are basically 
conservative. If all that is known about a component is the way that it works 
normally, and the fact that it can fail, then the formal methods provide a way 
of finding the 'worst ' way in which it can fail. Unless information is forth-
coming about the actual modes of failure in practice, a conservative policy is 
to provide protection against the effects of all possible failure modes. As 
more experience is gathered, more liberal design rules can be adopted. 
The modelling techniques used here are particularly appropriate for 
engineering purpose. Very often, analogue modelling is constrained by the 
lack of data. Logical reasoning of the kind used here can often yield adequate 
resul ts , and allow more accurate simulation methods to be used in just those 
areas where the economics of design are most ser ious. (For example, only 
relative sizes of constants for the compressed a i r supply system, not their 
numeric values, were needed). 
The modelling techniques are also significant for the collection of failure 
data. The normal working of a component can be described, and its normal 
working range. Then failure properties can be described by a model, either 
as certain consequences of a situation or as events occuring under normal 
circumstances with a certain probability. Failures occuring in a situation 
(condition) and failures occuring during an event, can be clearly distinguished 
(for example, failure of solder connections depends on situation, usually. 
Failure of relay contacts usually occurs during switching). Again, more 
precise descriptions of failure modes allows more liberal design rules to be 
used. 
It should be possible by using modelling techniques, to answer questions 
such as "can the sequence of events which happened ' there ' also happen here' 
An interesting application would be to use accident reports in this fashion. 
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and extend the range of usefulness of case studies as far as possible to new 
situations. 
The main problem with formal methods of failure analysis (or any form 
of failure analysis for that matter) is the cost. To achieve significant results 
for complex systems, with reasonably reliable components, requires a large 
amount of work. Use will generally be restricted to those areas where safety 
is involved. Formal methods have something to offer here. There is a possi-
bility for at least semi-automation of the analysis. 
There are three basic stages in failure mode analysis; modelling; cause 
consequence diagram construction; and mathematical analysis of event prob-
abilities. The methods used here are applicable to the second ttep - con-
structing event sequence diagrams. Analysis of probabilities involves a further 
step. Some of the simpler rules involved are described in appendix 3. 
Possibilities for automation of failure mode analysis 
Comparing a modern control system with earl ier examples, the modern 
system generally has more components, and these components are generally 
more reliable. The effect is that each failure mode has a lower probability. 
But the number of possible failure modes is much greater. A full analysis 
requires examination of a large number of unlikely circumstances. 
Failure mode analysis itself is a partial answer to this problem. The 
technique described in chapter 4 can be further automated, using a computer. 
The time taken to produce the diagram of fig. 16, by hand, was 1 \ man 
days. Most of this time was taken up in deducing events, and even more so 
in checking the conditions under which an event could take place. Procedures 
for performing such deductions on a computer exist (e.g. Robinson 1965). 
Both automatic and manual procedures suffer a disadvantage - they cannot 
be guaranteed to produce an answer in a finite amount of time. This situation 
does not occur often in practice, and in any case is not an important problem 
for failure mode analysis. If a failure event is suspected to occur, but cannot 
be proved to occur, assume that it does occur. However, the problem means 
that human monitoring is required, because if event deduction takes too long, 
it usually means that an e r ro r has been made in modelling. 
Further automation can help with recording information, and with plotting 
failure ir.ode analysis. The technique can certainly not be automated completely, 
however. There is simply too much computation involved, and heuristic rules 
are needed to guide the analysis. These are best applied by a human being. 
Also, one of the prime effects of the analysis process is to refine the 
component models and to correct e r r o r s in them. Failure mode analysis is 
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best regarded as a method of helping an engineer to understand a system. As 
such, complete automation is meaningless. 
Automation of parts of the failure mode analysis process is technically 
feasible. Whether such a step is worthwhile depends on how much of this kind 
of analysis is performed. Practical use would require use of interactive 
computing facilities, and the collection of a set of simple models for the com-
mon system components. It would also require some effort in improving the 
ease of understanding of the logical processes involved, and a better presen-
tation of the component descriptions. Natural language translations of the 
logical expressions would be desirable. 
More work is required in studying the individual steps in the deduction 
process. In particular, it is in principle possible for the event descriptions 
to become completely unwieldy, and for the deduction process to become very 
inefficient. The success in the examples chosen probably owes a lot to their 
simplicity. 
More work is also required in studying the way heuristic rules are used to 
limit the size of the failure mode analysis task. A list of some of the heuristic 
rules observed during intuitive construction of cause-consequence diagrams 
(Nielsen 1972) is shown in fig. 18. 
1 Having detected an event with a serious consequence, work backwards to 
find other event chains leading to the same consequence 
2 Stop analysing an event chain, or a t ree of condition combinations, when 
the probabilities involved become very low. 
3 If a chain or group of components has a simple constant input output 
description for all event chains, it can be treated as a single component, 
to reduce effort. The new description is deduced from the old. This can 
be extended to a hierarchical structuring of a system, with reduced detail. 
4 Standard situation combinations and event sequences can be recognized 
and stored for later use . 
5 Analysis for a single fault of for a single direct and several unrevealed 
faults, is most useful (generally gives high probabilities) 
6 Treat most frequent initial events first, and ignore low probability initial 
events. 
7 For probability distribution analysis of states - recognise repetition in 
an event sequence, and restructure the event sequence as a loop. Then 
use techniques for modelling markoff processes. 
Kig. Mi Heuristic rules used in simplifying failure mode analysis 
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Chapter 6 
CONCLUSIONS 
Some conclusions can be drawn from this study. On a theoretical level, 
the idea of formalizing failure mode analysis is primarily useful in that 
enables one to define what completeness means. A complete analysis is one 
which all possible sequences of events have been traced through a model. 
Different orders of completeness ar ise because one may take one, two, or 
more simultaneous failures into account. And any analysis is complete only 
with respect to a particular plant model (either a mental model or a formal 
model). A model will never be complete in explaining all possible features of 
plant behaviour, but it may be complete in explaining all observed forms of 
behaviour, or explaining a particular set of accident records for similar plant. 
The idea of using component models as a basis for organising failure data 
collection is attractive. But the amount of work involved before a reasonably 
large set of data could be collected, is daunting. Some improvement in mod-
elling procedure, over those used here , is required, if such work is to be 
made economic for complex systems. 
The amount of computation (mental or automated) involved in producing 
a complete failure mode analysis ( even with just a simple plant model) is 
seen to be very large. There is no doubt that engineers can produce qualitative 
analyses more cheaply than a computer system working alone. The main 
advantages from any automated approach would be in simpler data handling 
and presentation of resul ts , and in enabling a greater level of confidence in 
the completeness of the analyses. (If a designer can make a logical e r ror , so 
can an analyst). 
Any automated procedure will require interaction between man and ma-
chine, if only to draw on the mans experience of modelling, and to correct 
modelling e r r o r s . Human aid in recognising failure patterns, and in redirecting 
analyses along more efficient paths, should also be of great help. The initial 
attempts at 'applying1 automated procedures, using pencil and paper calculation, 
are encouraging. The amount of effort involved would be a trivial load for a 
computer. 
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APPENDIX 1 
SETS, FUNCTIONS, AND SYSTEMS 
Notation 
The concept of a system used here is based on mathematical logic, set 
theory, and general systems theory. The logical notation used is not standard, 
and so a short overview is given here 
mathematical logic 
The symbols used are shown in fig. 19. 
Meanings for the letters used may be given as follows. Letters at the 
beginning of the alphabet represent 'individual constants', names of individual 
objects such as 'this girl*, 'the colour green', 'the set of all integers' . Capital 
let ters at the end of the alphabet represent 'propositions', that is statements 
which are either true or false e. g. 'this girl is young1; or predicates, that 
i s , truth statements including variables e.g. 'x is young'. Lower case letters 
at the end of the alphabet represent variables. The letters P and Q, in this 
section, represent general strings of symbols, and are used to describe the 
way expressions are built up. 
Certain of the symbols used are regarded as basic symbols. The way in 
which the basic symbols may be combined to form expressions is shown in 
fig. 20. Other symbols are introduced by definition, in terms of the basic 
symbols. These are shown in fig. 21. 
In addition to the symbols described in table 1 and table 2, the sets of 
real and natural numbers are assumed to exist, and also the predicates 
'greater than' and ' less than* are used, and the functions 'plus' , 'minus' 
' t imes ' etc. 
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constant letters 
Proposition letters, 
Predicate letters 
variable letters 
notation used here 
not 
or 
for all 
is a 
implies 
and 
if then 
iff if 
thereisa such that 
the unique such that 
therisa unique such that 
and only if 
a, b t c 
X. V, Xi , Yl 
x, y, X,, y 
standard notation 
-\ 
V 
¥ 
£ 
A& 
=* 
<=> 
3 
i 
3! 
Fig. 19. Symbols used 
1 each letter is a term (upper and lower case let ters included, but not 
P, or Q) 
2 if x and X are terms then x isa X is a formula 
3 if x and Y are terms, then X = Y is a formula 
4 if P is a formula then not P is a formula 
5 if P and Q are formulae, then P or Q is a formula 
6 if P is a formula, then forall x, P is a formula. 
7 if P is a formula then the unique x such that P is a te rm. 
8 The only terms and formulae are those given by rules 1 to 7 
Fig. 20. Construction of logical formulae 
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P implies Q is defined as not P or Q 
P and Q is defined as not ((not P) or (not Q)) 
if P then Q is defined as P implies Q 
if P then Q is defined as (P implies Q) 
else R and ((not P) implies R) 
P iff Q is defined as (P implies Q) 
and (Q implies P) 
(if and only if) 
thereisa x such that P is defined as not for all x, (not P) 
Fig. 21. New symbols introduced by definition 
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Sets and functions 
Given the symbols already defined, it is possible to define 'sets'. The 
set of all objects with the property P (where P is a predicate) is written 
{ x | P (x) } 
and is read 'the set of all x such that P is true of x1 
This expression is equivalent to: 
The unique X such that forali x 
(x isa_X iff ((thereisa Y such that x isa_Y) and P(x))) 
Another way to describe a set is to list its members e. g. 
{ x, y.Z } 
is the set which contains just x, y, and z , 
An ordered pair is a set in which one member of the set is distinguished, 
being the first member of the set. An ordered pair is written as 
{x, y) 
and is defined as 
< * , { x , y } } 
Note the way that x is distinguished as the first member of the pair, by 
including it in the definition in two different ways. 
A function is a set of ordered pairs. The i^ea of a function is that, given 
the first member of an ordered pair, a single s ond member can be found. 
For example, given the function {(a, 1), (b, 2) , \c , 3), (d, 3)} and the 
parameter b, the value of the function, 2, can be found. 
Functions can be written using set notation, as above, or they can be 
given names e. g. F. Provision of a name for a function allows the value of 
a function for a particular parameter to be written, 
e. g. F(x) is the value of the function F given the parameter x. 
The set of 'first elements' in a function (a, b, and c in the example above) 
is called the domain of the function. The set of second elements is called the 
range of the function. A function should be thought of as providing a single 
member of the range set for each member of the domain set. 
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domain range 
Fig. 22. A function 
The operators plus, minus, times, etc. are functions with two parameters, 
since for each pair of parameters, a single value for the function is produced. 
The arithmetic operators can be written using functional notation 
e.g. plus (1, 2) = 3 
The usual notation 1+2, is regarded as on abbreviation of the functional 
notation. 
Functions of time 
In systems theory, different concepts of time are used for different 
purposes e.g. discrete time, continuous time. The concept of a 'time set* 
provides a basis for definition of these concepts. 
Two sets are introduced here - a set of time Instants and a set of time 
intervals. These two sets should obey certain properties, or axioms, given 
as follows 
T is a set of time instants 
t is a set of time intervals 
t . , t . etc. are time instants 
T , T„ etc. are time intervals 
1 ^ 
1 all time instants can be compared 
Forall t j , forall t=J t, < tg or t, = t2 or t, > tg 
There is a corresponding rule for time intervals. 
2 The sum of a time instant and a time interval is a time instant 
forall t, forall T , t + T isa T 
There is a corresponding rule for a pair of time intervals T
 1 T 2 
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3 the sum relation is associative and reflexive 
t + T = T + t 
there is a corresponding set of rules for pairs of time intervals 
consistency 
t + T . 
definition of subtration 
+ T iff t„ :U L 1 u 2 ^ — ^ 1 
If an instant of time t is chosen, then for any other time instant t , , rules 
o ' J 1 * 
5 b and 6 guarantee that there is a time instant T such that 
t, = t + i or t , = t - T 
1 o l o 
Rule 4 guarantees that Y is unique. As a result, the set of time intervals, 
together with one 'initial t ime' , can serve as a time set. 
The real numbers may be used as a time set. So may the integers, or 
the positive integers, etc. Generally, either two time sets are isomorphic, 
(one to one correspondence between their elements, and obeying the same 
rules) or one time set can be treated as a subset of the other. 
A function of time is a function for which the domain is a set of Aime 
instants, T, and the range is a set of values. V. A vector function of time is 
a time function for which the set of values is a set of ordered pairs , a set of 
ordered triples, etc. 
Fig. 23. A function of time 
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Processes 
The treatment here is based on (Windeknecht 1971). A process is a set 
of functions of time, in which all of the elements (that i s , all of the time 
functions) a re defined on the same time set 
If p ia a time function p(t) is the value of p at time t. If P is a process, 
P [ t ] is the set of possible values of processes in P at time t. 
P [ t ] = { p(t) | p isa_P} 
P [ t ] is called the attainable space of P at time t. 
P is the set of all values at which the functions in P may take, and is 
called the atta:'nable space of P . 
The product of two time functions p, and g is defined by 
pg = {<t, U,y)) | forall t, t isa_T implies (p(t) = x and g(t) = y)} 
In other words, if p and g are functions of time, pg is a vector function of time 
formed by taking the pairs of values p(t) and g(t), for each time t. 
The composite of two processes is defined by 
P Q = { Pg I P isa P and g isa Q } 
The composite of two processes is formed by taking all possible pairs of 
functions of time, and combining each pair to produce a vector function of time. 
systems 
A system description is a description of a composite process, as defined 
above, or a description of a subset of a composite process. More meaning can 
be given to this statement if special cases of system descriptions are con-
sidered. 
A composite process PQ is uncoupled if 
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(g isa Q and p isa P) implies pg isa PQ 
In effect, if p is an input function, it provides no information about the 
output function. 
A composite process PQ is functional if 
p l = P 2 i m P l i e s gj = 82 
Interpreting p and g as input and output functions of time, the output of 
a functional processor is completely determined by the input function. 
A composite process is bifunctional if 
P, = P2 i ? S-t = S2 
Output is determined by input, input is determined by output. The direction 
of causality is not determined for a bifunctional system description. 
A composite process PQ is free if the process P is constant, that i s , if 
p has only one member. In input output terms, there is only a constant 
input. 
In general, a system is simply a composite process. However the example 
of 'uncoupled composite processes shows that in some cases, the systems 
may appear somewhat strange. An uncoupled composite process corresponds 
to a system where input has no effect on output. 
memoryless systems 
A composite process PQ is static, or memoryless if for all X, PQ(t) is 
a function. 
That is, if p g^, p 2 g2 are members of PQ 
PtU) - p2(t) implies g1 (t) = g2(t) 
In other words, at each time t, there is only one output value to'be associ-
ated with each input value. Such systems can be described by means of the 
function F 
forall t, g{t) = F (t, p(t)) 
If the function F is a function of p(t) only, and not of t, the equation can 
be written 
forall t, g{t) - F(p(t)) 
Such systems are both memoryless and time invariant or uniforn. 
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State 
The examples of functional, and free systems give some idea of the con-
cept of state. For a free system, there is only one possible value for input. 
Any differences in output are therefore explained in terms of differences in 
'initial state1. 
A functional system has only one possible output function of time, for 
each input function of time. It is then natural to say that a functional system 
has only one initial state. 
In general, a state description of a system P, will consist of two further 
systems, R and Q, connected in ser ies . R will have an output which depends 
only on past input. The value of the output of R at time t, will correspond to 
state at time t. Q will be memoryless, and so correspond to an output func-
tion for the system. Windeknecht has shown how these ideas can be formalised, 
and that a state description can be given for any system. At the very worst, 
a state can be provided at each time t for every future output function. This 
corresponds to an explanation of all outputs in terms of changes of state 
alone. 
If a system is such that its output at time t is determined solely by inputs 
up to time t (and not by any differences in 'initial state'), then the set of dif-
ferent input functions up to time t can serve as the state of the system at time 
t. This is about as far as one can go, in general, in providing state descriptions 
of systems. It is always possible in principle, for a system to ' record' inputs 
up to time t, and to change the output at time t so that it depends uniquely on 
this information. 
APPENDIX 2 
DEDUCTION OF CONDITIONS AND EVENTS 
Conditions 
A predicate P(t ] f t2 , f) i s a condition description if 
forall t^, tb , [ ( t a i s a T and t b isa T and tj * tft ( tfe ( t ) 
implies P( t a , tfe, f)] 
This effectively states that a condition description is a predicate of such 
a form, that if it holds during a period, it holds during any subset of that 
period. To deduce a condition accross a component means to deduce a con-
dition description with the component output signal as parameter, and which 
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contains as much irredundant information about the output signal as possible. 
The idea of deduction accross a component can be made more precise, 
if the language for expressing condition descriptions is restricted, so that 
the only symbols to be used are forall, and, not, function symbols, predicate 
symbols, variables, and constants. The form of statements required is called 
skolem normal form, and is defined as follows. 
A constant is a term 
A variable is a term 
A function symbol followed by a string of terms is a termfthe number of 
te rms following the function symbol is the degree of the function) 
A predicate symbol followed by a string of terms is a formula. 
A formula preceded by a not symbol is a li teral 
A set of formulae, separated by or symbols is a clause. 
A set of clauses separated by and symbols is a matrix. 
A forall symbol followed by a variable is a quantification. 
A matrix, preceded by a set of quantifications, so that there is one 
quantification for each variable in the matrix, is a statement 
in skolem normal form. 
Any mathematical statement can, if necessary, be translated to skolem 
normal form, although methods which avoid doing this are preferable because 
of the inconvenience and complexity of the resulting statements. If a state-
ment does not involve variables, then skolem normal form simplifies, to 
become conjunctive normal form. 
A method, called resolution, (Robinson 1965) exists for deducing all of 
the clauses which follow, or can be deduced from, a given initial set of clauses. 
For clauses which do not involve variables, the method is quite simple 
e .g . 
1 (A or B or C) and (D or E or (not C)) 
2 A or B or D or E 
Which means that line 2 can be deduced from line 1. 
For clauses which do involve variables, it involves finding a substitution 
for the variables, so that a deduction of the kind given above can be made. 
e .g . 
Forall x, Forall y, (A or C(x)) and (B or not C(y)) 
Forall 2 , (A or Cfe)) and (B or not C(z)) 
A or B 
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Once all possible clauses have been deduced, they can be separated, and each 
clause treated as a statement in its own right. Resolution, applied to a set of 
clauses consisting of an input condition description and a component descrip-
tion, produces an extended set of clauses. This extended set is an apt candi-
date for the role of output condition description. 
There are two problems with this new output condition description. It 
contains too much information about the input conditions and the component 
itself. And it contains some redundant information about the output of the 
component itself. 
The first problem can be solved by striking out all clauses which make 
no reference to the output of the component. 
The second problem, of redundant information, arises because of pairs 
of clauses of the form 
A or B or C and A or B 
The second clause, A or B is said to subsume the first clause, A or B or 
C, because whenever the second clause is t rue, the first clause is inevitably 
t rue . Similarly the clause forail x. P(x) subsumes the clause P(a). Subsumed 
clauses add no additional information to the output condition description, and 
are not necessary for deducing subsequent output conditions for other com-
ponents. Subsumed clauses may therefore be deleted. Resolution is a com-
plete method, in that it will find all possible clauses which can be deduced 
(by any sound method) from an original set of clauses. However, resolution, 
in its own right, t reats only those expressions containing and, or, not, and 
forall symbols. The set of expressions treated can be very quickly extended, 
to include if-then-else, implies, there exists. However extensions to include 
the symbols of set theory, is a, = , or to include the symbols of arithmetic, 
, , +, - , is much more difficult. 
There are two basic ways of extending the scope of the resolution method. 
One is to add a set of new clauses, as axioms to describe the new operators. 
These are introduced for all subsequent deductions and lead to a considerable 
loss of efficiency. An alternative is to develop new methods of deduction, 
which are complete, like resolution, but allow more symbols to be used. This 
is a considerable technical problem, but some progress has been made 
(Robinson 196 Slagle 1972). For many practical purposes, incomplete methods 
may suffice, provided only that all the desired output conditions are obtained. 
The general form of an output condition, if a component with memory and 
with several inputs, is treated, will be 
If A (input) and B(state) then C (output) 
and jf A 1 (input) and Bj (state) then Cj (output) 
and lf_An(input) and Bn(state) then._ C (output) 
This form will correspond to a condition t ree in a cause consequence 
diagram, and will be called a contingent condition. 
events 
An ordered pair of condition descriptions, 
A M P ^ t , , . t , 2 , f,). P 2 ( t 2 r t 2 2 , f2)). 
is an event description if and only if 
f = f = f 
*1 2 X 
and thereisa t . , t„ such that 
forall t n o t f c p ^ , t, f) implies P2(t , Xv f ) | 
In other words P . and P 9 refer to the same time function f; and either 
P J t , t, f) is inconsistent with p (t, X , f), or P2(t , t2> f) contains more 
information or is more precise, than anything which could be deduced from 
P 1 ( t 1 , t, f). 
The fact that event A occurs at time t is written 
t e : P 1 ( t r t, f) - P2(t , t2 , f) 
This is equivalent to: 
there is a t . such that P ( t , , t , f) 
and there is a t g such that P 2 ( t e . t„ , f) 
To deduce an event accross a component involves taking three sets of 
clauses 
1 The component description 
2 The set of conditions on any 'auxiliary inputs' 
3 The set of 'state conditions' 
and resolving these with the first part of an input event description, to pro-
duce the first output condition description. P. ' . In general, this will be a 
contingent condition description, and will be valid over a wider period of time 
( i .e . later) than the input condition. 
The second step is to repeat this deduction, but using the second part of 
the event description, to obtain P 2 ' . The third step is to t ry to find if there 
are any points in time, greater than t , at which either P . ' is inconsistent 
with P«1, or at which P „ ' cannot be deduced from P 1 ' . A theorem proving 
program can be used for both of these tasks, but there are problems. The 
time to deduce inconsistency cannot be predicted, and so in general it is 
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impossible to guarantee inconsistency within a finite period of computing time, 
(the condition descriptions may be consistent anyway). Similarly, the only 
way to prove that P 2 ' cannot be deduced from P 1 ' is to try to make the deduc-
tion, for a potentially infinite period of time. 
However, in practice, consistency and deducibility can be judged 'by eye1, 
if the formulae are presented in a reasonable way. And for more difficult 
cases, it is sufficient to try to prove consistency, for a reasonable period of 
time, and if unsuccessful, to try to prove inconsistency, again for a reason-
able period. If neither attempt is successful, the 'safe' assumption, that an 
event takes place, is assumed. 
The result i s , in general, a contingent event description, the occurrence 
of the event being dependent on the state of the component; and on the con-
ditions at any inputs other than the one associated with the input event descrip-
tion. 
As an example of this process, a 'thermal relay' can be used. Such a 
relay has the property that if an input current is provided at time t, the relay 
closed at some later time, t + a. If the input current is shut off at time t :, 
the relay opens at some later time, t* + b. A rapid sequence in which the 
relay current is cut, and then restored once more, will not result in the relay 
contacts opening. 
An approximate model of a thermal relay, which shows this behaviour, 
i s : 
Forall t. y(t) = 1 iff 
[ (Forall t , , t - a ( t, < t implies x(t,) = 1) 
or (thereisa t„ such that x(t,) = 1 and y(t„) = 1 
and t 2 < t < t 2 + b)] 
The result of an input event 
te: x(t) » 0 - x(t) - 1 
is evaluated in diagram 26 
The resulting output event i s . 
Condition 1 
Forall t, [ not (the ris a t' such that x(t') = 1 and y(t') = 1 and t' < t (V + b) 
and t" < t ( t + a ] implies y(t) = 0 
Condition 2 
Forall t, [ (thereisa t» such that x(t') « 1 and y(t') * 1 and t* ( t { t' + b) 
or t + a < t < t ,M] implies y(t) = 1 
z « ) * 1 
and 
y(«)=l 
ta4a~b<t 
z(t)sO-><(tM 
t .+a: 
»10=0* 
Fig. 25L Contingent event 
This can be reformulated as two contingent events 
1 not therisa t such that t + a - b ( t < t" and x(t) = t and y(t) = 1 
t e + a: y{t) = 0 - y(t) = 1 
2 not thereisa t such that t + a - b( t (t" and x(t) = 1 and y(t) = 1 
and therisa t such that t" - b ( t ( t + a and x(t) = 1 and y(t) = 1 
: y(t) = 0 . y(t) = 1 
On checking the second event - it proves impossible to fulfill the necess-
ary conditions, within the period of interest. After producing an output event 
description, it is necessary to check whether the conditions upon Which the 
output event description are contingent, can actually exist. In principle, this 
means checking backwards through the component network at each step, is 
a similar fashion to event tracing. However, a simpler procedure will be 
described. 
First, when begining a cause consequence analysis, an initial set of 
conditions are required for each of the variables of the system. These are 
either assumptions, or are derived from other assumptions by deduction. 
These initial conditions are recorded for each component. 
In evaluating a sequence of events starting from, say, a single failure, 
it is only necessary to check that the event sequence produced is consistent 
with the initial conditions. In evaluating the event sequence, a new set of 
fV^il b, 
s ( t U t i « \ ,*MUi »CUM !~é ) < 0 =1 ( J ' i " < i-i+tOj i-&« ^0= o 
fwiu, 
Fig. 26. Deduction of an event accross a thermal relay component. 
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££»»••*» <4»;«h»JktaA y»»fcb*r
 ( &Jink »~iv«»«A y«*»*;|c«« 
i\k fik) - t« tU >•'•* U.»tU» t »JLyuUr tk -^ t-lr J i i »W—(]«•)'( 
2C )<» )=» J 
(b t»«. < t, < t f "«* * " • ) s * £. -^  CtJ =-4. 
2. —« 
«(PM):i <WJ» t-«£t,<t- sr *Uj )= i ar "*)•• ^ W M 
Fig. 26. Continued. 
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* * J U U . «j^ «b-«£ v«Jk t f . > ( t ) > 0 -» »CO » 1 
IU* truwLJfcM tir 
t F«^"- kfc KgV ( P, tu ) < tfc < Ve) o r « * * (t») = L 
^ »-£ Vr~Å t , j > ( t , < t | < f ^ O ) e r * C *8) = 1 
8 «.(PcO) = i f -A t - » < t j / t »r a t P,<»»)<t,<»t £ »at « ( 0 » i 
1 1 | t P W ) « l £ * t U < » ) < t «r M * P , i * t ) < t , < t » <* M» ^ ( 0 « i 
( j f V f" £ c ( P ( l ) ) t l rr •«* t - * < t j < t QW* P. (*»)<*»< * i ^ 
tei $PM<KPW*C^ *-» ° i <* E^ P.^ »>< H <tfc^J-) ^ u jW» f l 
— 4 k - » < kj < t 
Fig. 26. Continued. 
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t-J p&) < t < P<»1 *lr) 
isj^ji« * l>) = 6 
•r (tuj»». P, iri «.«MU> xtpt^si 
~A «(H»))» t 
iU P<t) < t< PH +t- ^ iikj« »<04 
Fig. 26. Continued. 
U I X fc , n ^ J J l K , P, Ct,>< *J < k* S£d *** < *» < 0 
tcd »«V(tU»tw HO » . A n a K CMtt) ' 1 
tU*i»o> P, ( t t ) «.J»M' 
isé j fNOJ-l 
Fig. 26. Continued ' 
x l t ) . l 
T 
tt +a-b 
ittt.o— 
«(t)»t 
^ TT 
l».v 
yW -0— 
»10-1 
C O M I 
tot* 
t t t * 
t t « - » 
nowmocnif« 
bscomi 
yttt-1 bsfera t>l i*a 
no event occurs because 
y(t) = I before t - t-ta 
Flg. 26. Continued. 
- 60 -
conditions will be deduced for each component. These must also be stored, 
temporarily, for checking, in the case that there is a loop in the component 
network. 
If a 'double failure' analysis is to be performed, not only the initial 
conditions must be checked, for each event, but also the set of conditions 
which might result from a previous failure. 
APPENDIX 3 
CALCULATION OF EVENT PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTIONS 
Many of the events in a failure mode analysis are 'certain'. That is , they 
will certainly happen at some particular time during system operation. Many 
failure events, though, are best described by giving a probability of failure. 
For use with automated failure analysis, the most convenient method is 
to work with an event 'probability density function', p. d. f. (Cox 1962). 
If x is the event time 
p.d.f. (x) = (t prob (t ( x < t t j t ) 
a t - o '. t 
There will be a pdf associated with every event description box in an 
event sequence diagram. What follows is a set of rules for finding the pdf's 
for all the event descriptions, when the p.d.f. 's for a set of initial events 
are given. 
1 Simple chain of events, without delay 
M«) 
* t :P 2 ( i ) = P,ltl 
P2(t) 
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The probability of occurrence of an event at time t, is the same for a cause 
event and a consequence event 
2 Chain of events with delay 
I Pilt) 
* t : P 2 ( t ) = P,(t-td) 
Pjttl 
3 Chain of events with non deterministic delay 
In some cases, one event follows another, with a delay which cannot be 
determined precisely, but a probability distribution can be given for the delay. 
Let x^  be the time for the first event, t , be the delay time x„ be the time 
for the second event. Let P j , P- , P„, be the corresponding pdf's. Let p „ 
p2> p3 be the corresponding 'incremental probabilities'. 
then 
t'=0 
p3(t x2 t + t ) » t , S t p [ t - t ' < x , « t - t' t t t and 
t ' < t d « f + A t ] 
= r p,(t - f ) . p2(t')dt' 
J x 2 
since even* and length of delay are independent 
P3W =  / t P , ( t - t ' , , 
P|»d = 1) = Pjl1) 
¥ 1 : P j l t u f ' p , ! ! - « ) P2I»)H« 
|PS(t> J° B 
4 Event depends on a prior condition 
In gome cases an event A, occurring at time t, will cause an event B, 
occuring at time t, only if some condition C is fulfilled at the time t. 
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Let P . be the probability that A occurs between times t and t + 4 t. 
Let P , be the probability that condition C holds between times t and 
t+ At 
Let P„ be the probability that event B occurs between times t and t +A t 
Then 
given that A and C are independent 
•Ml ) 
P,(«) 
P 3 t t l T T ^ l t 
v t p 3 m = p ^ t i . P j i t ) 
i v t p 4 i t i = p , ( t ) . ( i - P j ( t i ) 
Decision box 
5 Contingent events 
In many cases, an event B occurs as a result of an event A, but only if 
some other event, C, has already occurred. The probability that an event 
has occurred prior to time t, is the integral of the probability density func-
tion, and is called the cumulative distribution function. 
p,in A 
p 2»> ¥ i : P 2 | t ) : ("' P,(«)dx 
Jo 
Event to condition bo« 
Note the change of time variable involved. 
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I ' l l*) P2(«) 
—H— 
Or box 
| P 3 l t l V t : P j ( t ) : P ^ t l + P j I t M V H . t y t ) 
I 
Pit«) p 2 m 
And box 
T 
| P j ( t ) ¥ t : P I ( t ) : P 1 ( « ) . P 2 | t | 
Pi It) 
IL 
Not bo« 
| P | ( t ) V t : P j | t l = l - P , ( t | 
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6 Compound conditions 
Conditions are best described by the probability that the condition holds 
at time t. This will generally be a result of the fact that some event has 
occurred prior to time t. So conditions are described by cumulative dis t r i -
bution functions. 
Combinations of independent conditions may be evaluated as in the 
following diagrams. As an example - the probability that two conditions, A 
and B, both hold at time t, is given by 
let P1(t) be the probability that A holds at time t 
let P„(t) be the probability that B holds at time t 
let conditions A and B be independent. 
Then 
P3(t) = P (A holds at time t and B holds at time t) 
= P ^ t ) . P2(t) 
